Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interactions in New Zealand by Wesselbaum, Dennis
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interactions
in New Zealand
Dennis Wesselbaum
University of Hamburg, German Physical Society, EABCN
4. September 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58763/
MPRA Paper No. 58763, posted 25. September 2014 02:03 UTC
Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interactions in New Zealand
Dennis Wesselbaum∗
University of Hamburg, German Physical Society, and EABCN
September 4, 2014
Abstract
This paper aims to characterize the interactions between ﬁscal and monetary and policy
in New Zealand. We estimate a multivariate Markov-switching model and document frequent
policy switches. We identify two regime: accommodative and non-accommodative monetary
policy. In the non-accommodative regime, monetary policy does not respond to changes in
government debt, while it does so in the accommodative regime. Further, we show that the
underlying shocks are characterized by a fair amount of heteroscedasticity.
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1 Introduction
Fiscal and monetary policy in almost all industrial countries are decided by two separate insti-
tutions. However, those polices are hardly independent as changes in one policy will impact the
eﬀectiveness of the other.1 A second common ground is that those interactions are subject to
changes over time. For example, Davig and Leeper (2011) show that the eﬃciency of ﬁscal policy
interventions depends on the intertemporal ﬁnancing decisions of those interventions. They go on
and show that switches in monetary and ﬁscal policy regimes crucially eﬀect government spending
multipliers. Chung et al. (2007) show that if agents believe that policy interactions might be sub-
ject to changes in the future, ﬁscal and monetary policy shocks generate wealth eﬀects that change
the impact of shocks and the ability of policy makers to response to those shocks.
Along this line, the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL, for short) describes monetary-ﬁscal
policy interactions. The FTPL claims that the price level in an economy can only be determined
by ﬁscal policy. Here, the interpretation of the government budget constraint is at the heart of
this theory. It is interpreted as an equilibrium restriction that generates changes in the price level
whenever ﬁscal variables (such as debt) change. From a more-game theoretical viewpoint, ﬁscal
policy chooses a strategy for its instruments (e.g. spending and taxes, ultimately surplus and debt)
and, conditional on this strategy, monetary policy chooses its strategy, i.e. the interest rate.
Monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions are particularly interesting in New Zealand. New
Zealand being an advanced, small-open economy is the most business-friendly economy in the
world. Its economy was characterized by high and stable growth rates of about 2.6 percent until re-
cently, combined with low inﬂation rates (around 2 percent) and low unemployment rates (reaching
its minimum at about 4 percent in 2007) and has outperformed other advanced economies. Fur-
ther, New Zealand has a real government debt of roughly 40 percent of GDP which is remarkably
low compared to other advanced economies.2 Therefore, it is particularly interesting to analyze
the interactions between ﬁscal and monetary policy that contributed to this outstanding economic
performance.
This paper aims at shedding light on the interactions between monetary and ﬁscal policy. For
this purpose, we employ a multivariate Markov-switching model and document regime instability
in the conduct of monetary and ﬁscal policy and their interactions. We show that in the twenty
years of our sample, ﬁve policy switches occured. We identify two disticnt regimes and label them
accommodative and non-accommodative monetary policy. In the non-accommodative regime, mon-
etary policy does not respond to changes in government debt. In contrast, in the accommodative
regime, the monetary authority lowers the interest rate with increasing debt. Further, the non-
accommodative regime is characterized by a Taylor-type interest rate rule solely driven by the
1There are several other possible transmission channels between ﬁscal and monetary policy. For example, expec-
tations of higher deﬁcits may cause a lack of conﬁdence in the ﬁscal sustainability of debt and trigger turbulence in
ﬁnancial markets, havin adverse real eﬀects. More common are wage-price spirals caused by the impact of tax policy
on prices.
2 In the United States, for example, this share is roughly 70 percent of GDP.
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inﬂation rate with a negative coeﬃcient. In the accommodative regime, debt, output, and inﬂation
drive interest rates.
For the ﬁscal authority, the accommodative regime is characterized by a positive relation be-
tween output and debt. In the non-accommodative, an increase in output reduces debt which
follows the countercyclical Keynesian point of view. Finally, we document sizable diﬀerences in the
variance of the monetary policy and debt shocks. We ﬁnd that the non-accommodative regime is
associated with larger shocks.
Our results are related to the work by Muscatelli et al. (2002) use (Bayesian) VAR models
to estimate the ﬁscal-monetary interactions. They ﬁnd that both policies are used as strategic
complements rather than substitutes. Further, they show that ﬁscal policy responds less to the
business cycles since the 1980’s. Earlier work by Mélitz (1997, 2000) and Wyplosz (1999) using
panel data on a set of countries shows that both policies are, in contrast, used as substitutes.
Dungey and Fry (2009) use a SVAR model that allows for stationary and non-stationary variables,
therefore allowing for temporary and permanent shocks. They ﬁnd that in New Zealand ﬁscal policy
shocks have been larger than monetary policy shocks. For ﬁscal policy, they show that government
spending shocks played a minor role compared to tax and debt policy shocks.
2 A Multivariate Markov-Switching Model
In this section we aim to identify regime changes in the conduct of monetary and ﬁscal policy
interaction. For this purpose, we use a multivariate Markov-switching model. This tool enables me
to analyze non-linearities in the observed time series by assuming structural breaks in subsamples.
Markov-switching models are employed by Choi et al. (2003) studying the eﬀects of inﬂation
targeting in New Zealand. They ﬁnd a structural break in the inﬂation rate right at the time of the
policy change. Further Buckle et al. (2002) and Halland McDermott (2006) use Markov-switching
models to study the dynamics of growth, volatility, and business cycles.
In the following, we consider a multivariate setting to describe the evolution of ﬁscal and
monetary policy. For this purpose, government debt is a function of the interest rate - since interest
payments depend on the interest rate -, and output, Yt. The idea is to treat this equation as a
reduced form equation, where expenditures and revenues are driven by ﬁscal rules with feedback
to output and interest rates. Further, monetary policy is explained by an augmented Taylor-type
interest rate rule with feedback to inﬂation, output, and government debt. The innovations εB,t
and εi,t are normally distributed. This model can be formulated as
it = β0 + β1,RtBt + β2,RtYt + β3,Rtπt + εi,t, (1)
Bt = α0 + α1,RtYt + α2,Rtit + εB,t, (2)
εi,t ∼ N

0, σ2i,Rt

, (3)
εS,t ∼ N

0, σ2S,Rt

, (4)
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where cov (εB,t, εi,t) = 0. Then, Rt is the state in time t and we assume two states. The state-
dependent variance of the innovations is σ2B and σ
2
i , while the α’s and β’s are the coeﬃcients of
the explanatory variables. Further, there exists a transition matrix P that describes the likelihood
of state changes,
Pt =

p11,t p12,t
p21,t p22,t

, (5)
where pij,t gives the probability from changing from state i to state j at time t, which we relate to
the inﬂation rate.
In our analysis, we use quarterly data from 1994Q2 to 2014Q1 which gives a total of 80 ob-
servations. Time series are seasonally adjusted (using Census X-12 method) and are measured in
million U.S. Dollars. All time series are taken from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. To be
precise, the time series for government debt is total Government securities on issue (table D1). The
inﬂation rate is measured as the quarter-to-quarter change in the consumer price index (table M1).
For output, we use the time series for real gross domestic product (GDP) (table M5). Finally, the
interest rate is computed from the monthly overnight interbank cash rate (table B2).
3 Discussion
The results of the Markov-switching estimation are as follows
it = 4.96
(0.46)
+

−10.29
(3.9)
2.4
(3.98)

Bt +
28.15
(4.91)
−9.26
(8.46)

Yt +
 2.08
(0.56)
−1.97
(0.6)

πt + εi,t, (6)
Bt = 0.11
(0.02)
+
 0.97
(0.16)
−0.13
(0.48)

Yt +
−0.02
(0.48)
−0.05
(0.01)

it + εB,t, (7)
εi,t ∼ N
0, 0.002(0.0003)
0.01
(0.004)
 , (8)
εB,t ∼ N
0,2.03(0.43)
2.70
(1.39)
 . (9)
Starting with the equation for government debt, we - again - ﬁnd a small and signiﬁcant constant
(0.11). The coeﬃcient on output is only signiﬁcant in regime 1 at a value of roughly 1. This implies
a one-to-one movement of output and debt changes. If we think about this as relationship driven by
ﬁscal rules, a one Dollar increase in output aﬀects the ﬁscal instruments such that debt increases
by one Dollar. As debt increases, we can infer that either spending increases or taxes decrease
(assuming that we are on the increasing part of the Laﬀer curve). Furthermore, we ﬁnd that in
regime 1 the coeﬃcient on the interest rate is insigniﬁcant, implying that ﬁscal instruments and
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Figure 1: Smoothed transition probabilities - New Zealand.
debt do not respond to this monetary policy tool. In regime 2, the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at a value
of -0.05. Increasing the interest rate would reduce government debt. This might be counterintuitive
at a ﬁrst glance, however, given that we understand this equation as a reduced form driven by rules
on ﬁscal instruments, an increase in the interest rate will create an incentive for the ﬁscal authority
to adjust the instruments such that, at the end, debt is reduced. Intuitively, higher interest rate
at a given level of government debt will increase the interest payments. Finally, we ﬁnd that in
regime 2, which we label as non-accommodative, the volatility of the debt shocks is 50 percent
larger compared to the accommodative regime 1, 2.7 vs. 2.
Turning to the interest rate rule, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant constant of roughly ﬁve percent. In
regime 2, the interest rate is solely driven by the inﬂation rate. Interestingly, the results show a
negative value of -1.97. However, this value still fulﬁls the Taylor-principle of larger than one-to-one
movements of inﬂation and the interest rate. In contrast, in regime 1 we obtain three signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients. Government debt enters negatively (-10.29) implying an accommodative behavior of
monetary policy. Increasing debt will lead to a reduction in the interest rate further boosting real
activity. Further, there is a strong relation between output and the interest rate. We ﬁnd a larger
than usual coeﬃcient of roughly 28. Given that we ﬁnd a weight of about two on the inﬂation
rate, monetary policy responds stronger to movements in output than to movements in inﬂation.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that the volatility in the non-accommodative regime (regime 2) is ﬁve time larger
than in the accommodative regime.
The estimated time series for the transition probabilities are shown in ﬁgure 1.We observe eight
drops in the probability to stay in regime 1, 2 respectively. The average time of regime 1 is 7.08
quarters and 7.82 for regime 2. Therefore, on average, every two years there is a diﬀerent policy
regime in place. Further, let us consider the time series for the regime switches presented in ﬁgure
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Figure 2: Markov-switching probabilities.
2.We ﬁnd ﬁve regime switches over the time span from 1994 to 2014. The ﬁrst and the second
switch occur in 1998, where policy switches from non-accommodative (regime 1) to accommodative
(regime 2) for one quarter. In 1998 it was expected that the next four years would end with a ﬁscal
deﬁcit. However, it was forecasted that the government under some circumstances would run a
surplus. Along this line, the so-called "Policies for Progress" programme featured steps that would
improve the ﬁscal position; paying tribute to the fact that debt and government expenditure goals
couldn’t be reached in time. The observed policy switch might indicate that there was the believe
that ﬁscal policy would generate surpluses and put debt on a stable trajectory. As it turns out,
this believe was quickly revised given the fact that the government run deﬁcits in stead of surpluses
and the outlook deteriorated.
The third switch from non-accommodative to accommodative occurs in 2008 and lasts for
roughly three years. This switch occurs rougly one year before debt started to explode. In 2008,
New Zealand entered the Great Recession this might explain why the monetary authority changed
its behavior towards running higher debt levels. Reducing the adverse recessionary forces, fostering
growth and employment in the global economic crisis might have created an incentive for the
monetary authority to accept higher levels of debt given that the expenditures associated with
this debt will have positive eﬀects. Again, New Zealand, especially compared to other advanced
economies, was running a fairly low level of government debt which gives some space for debt-
ﬁnanced ﬁscal spending. The fourth switch back from accommodative to non-accommodative
happens in 2011 lasting for about two years. This switch occurs right at the time debt levels started
to fall. However, the switch indicates that the eﬀorts by the ﬁscal authority have been viewed critical
by the monetary authority such that deemed it necessary to create further incentives to reduce debt
levels. The ﬁnal and ﬁfth switch occurs right at the end of our sample in the beginning of 2013.
At the time of the switch debt levels, after falling for two quarters, started to increase again. It
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appears that the commitment by the ﬁscal authority to reduce the debt level (the expense and
revenue forecasts) was credible, leading to the accommodative behavior of the monetary authority.
In addition, to those policy switches, we observe four more peaks in the probability to stay in
the respective regime (see ﬁgure 1). Here, although the probability to leave the regime increased,
the model still picked that no switch would ﬁt the data better than a policy switch. Nevertheless,
it indicates that around those times (1997, 2001, 2007, 2010) a regime switch was more likely than
to stay in the given regime. This further supports our point of view that interactions between ﬁscal
and monetary policy are characterized by a large amount of time variability.
4 Conclusion
This paper aims at characterizing the interactions between monetary and ﬁscal policy in New
Zealand. New Zealand is a particularly interesting candidate for such an analysis as its economic
performance is outstanding among the advanced economies and it experienced signiﬁcant changes
of ﬁscal and monetary policy over time.
We use a multivariate Markov-switching model to show that the interactions between monetary
anf ﬁscal policy is subject to frequent regime switches. Our sample starts in 1994 and ends in
2014. Over this time span, we observe ﬁve policy switches. We identify two disticnt regimes and
label them accommodative and non-accommodative monetary policy. In the non-accommodative
regime, monetary policy does not respond to changes in government debt. In contrast, in the ac-
commodative regime, the monetary authority lowers the interest rate with increasing debt. Further,
the non-accommodative regime is characterized by a Taylor-type interest rate rule solely driven by
the inﬂation rate with a negative coeﬃcient. In the accommodative regime, debt, output, and
inﬂation drive interest rates. Fiscal policy in the accommodative regime is characterized by a pos-
itive relation between output and debt. In the non-accommodative, an increase in output reduces
debt which follows the countercyclical Keynesian point of view. Finally, we the variances of the
underlying monetary policy and debt shocks vary sizably across the two regimes.
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